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Abstract: 
Does migration facilitate regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks? The 
evidence from post-communist economies indicates that the efficacy of migration 
in reducing inter-regional unemployment and wage differentials has in fact been 
rather low. High wages appear to encourage, and, similarly, high unemployment 
tends to discourage, overall migration – inbound and outbound – rather than 
induce a net flow from depressed regions to those with better economic 
conditions. Even when the impact of unemployment and wages on net migration 
is statistically significant, it is economically very small. Finally, migration flows 
have actually been declining in the course of transition, even as inter-regional 
disparities have been rising.  
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Non-technical Summary 
The economic reforms initiated across Central and Eastern Europe at the end of 1980s 
and in early 1990s have had dramatic labor market repercussions. In the matter of one or two 
years, the formerly socialist economies (with the exception of the Czech Republic) moved 
from essentially full employment to double-digit unemployment rates. At the same time, real 
output levels virtually collapsed as the process of creative destruction set in. Importantly, the 
reforms proved to have strongly asymmetric effects on regions, reflecting the unevenness of 
distribution of winners and losers from the reforms. While some districts experienced 
negligible unemployment (or even a lack of qualified labor) and rising real incomes, others 
were marred by grave structural problems leading to high joblessness and dramatic 
deterioration of the standard of living. In such a situation, migration can potentially play an 
indispensable role as an equalizing mechanism. When idle or underpaid labor moves in search 
of better employment prospects, labor-market imbalances are reduces and regional disparities 
gradually get smoothed away. Besides facilitating efficient allocation of productive resources, 
migration also reduces the strain on public finances and thus eliminates potential political 
tensions over fiscal redistribution – such as those that lead to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, 
or those currently experienced by Germany, Belgium and Italy.  
This paper therefore studies the efficacy of migration in facilitating regional adjustment 
during post-communist transition in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The 
analysis relates migration rates to regional unemployment rates and average wages. To enable 
comparisons with market economies, similar results for Italy, Spain and Portugal are also 
presented. The main finding is that migration in transition economies is little effective in 
facilitating regional adjustment in the wake of asymmetric shocks. While migration flows 
indeed respond to unemployment and wages, regional economic variables have similar effect 
on gross immigration and emigration. Thus, wages are positively related not only to gross 
immigration but also gross emigration, while unemployment similarly tends to discourage 
both immigration and emigration. This renders the effect of net migration on reducing 
regional disparities rather small, even when it is statistically significant.  
Low efficacy of migration in facilitating regional adjustment to asymmetric shocks has 
important policy implications. First, regional disparities will remain persistent, unless other 
mechanisms of regional adjustment (e.g. inter-regional capital mobility) are more effective. 
Second, it is generally anticipated that the next round of EU enlargement will lead to a 
massive inflow of immigrants from East to West. The paper at hand suggests that labor in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
 
transition economies is little mobile, and even sizeable potential gains from migration (in 
terms of wage and unemployment differentials) only lead to modest net immigration. Indeed, 
when exploring the possibility of a non-linear relationship between wages and net migration, 
the pattern actually appears hump-shaped rather than U-shaped (except in Hungary), 
suggesting that the effect of wages on migration falls as wages rise (although this result may 
be driven by omitted structural characteristics of regions correlated with wages). Hence, it 
seems rather unlikely that the next round of EU enlargement will result in the current EU 
members being swamped by cheap immigration from the East. Finally, because of the low 
adjustment capability of the transition economies’ labor markets, a rapid accession to the euro 
zone may not be optimal, especially if the transition countries continue to be subject to 
different shocks than the EMU core (as seems to be the case at present, according to available 
empirical evidence). Participation in the euro zone will imply the loss of monetary autonomy 
and important restrictions (due to the Maastricht criteria) on fiscal policy. With migration 
being largely ineffective as a channel of regional adjustment, the traditional optimum-
currency-area criteria of symmetry of shocks may need to weigh in rather prominently when 
deciding on abandoning national currencies.  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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1  Introduction 
Migration, or labor mobility
1, is an important economic phenomenon. Migrants move 
from regions with high unemployment and/or low incomes to more prosperous regions, 
attracted by higher wages and better employment prospects. In this manner, migration helps 
facilitate regional adjustment to asymmetric shocks (such as an idiosyncratic fall in demand 
for the region’s products, or technological progress that renders productive facilities in the 
region obsolete). In a hypothetical economy with perfect labor mobility, regions would adjust 
to asymmetric shocks instantaneously.
2 When factor mobility is limited and/or prices and 
wages rigid, however, the effects of asymmetric shocks persist and regional economies have 
to rely on other mechanisms, such as inter-regional fiscal redistribution, to deal with them. A 
common comparison in this context is the difference between the US and continental Europe 
(see, for example, Eichengreen, 1993, 1998). In the US, labor mobility is high and plays an 
important role in reducing unemployment and wage differentials between regions (Blanchard 
and Katz, 1992). In contrast, European countries often display persistent economic differences 
between regions such as North and South of Italy, or East and West Germany, and labor 
mobility contributes little in smoothing those differentials away (Decressin and Fatas, 1995).  
The role of migration in facilitating regional adjustment is particularly important in 
countries undergoing fundamental structural changes. The post-communist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe initiated economic reforms with essentially no (official) 
unemployment and very egalitarian wage distribution. The subsequent transition from central 
planning to a market economy, however, was associated with dramatic and largely 
asymmetric economic developments (for example, regions differed in their dependence on 
trade with the CMEA, see Repkine and Walsh, 1999). In turn, these developments lead to 
increasing regional disparities (see section 4 and the appendix for a more detailed discussion). 
The widening gap between prosperous and depressed regions increases the need for regional 
adjustment, with migration being a potentially important mechanism evening out inter-
regional differentials in wages and unemployment rates. This paper analyzes the efficacy of 
this mechanism in four Central European transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
                                                 
1 The terms migration and labor mobility are used interchangeably in the present paper.  
2 In fact, migration is only one of several possible channels of regional adjustment. According to the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, with free trade, flexible prices and transferable technology, factor prices are equalized 
across regions, and trade, capital mobility and labor mobility are substitutes in facilitating regional adjustment.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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Poland, and Slovakia. For comparison, results for three Southern European EU countries – 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal – are also presented.  
Although studying migration is interesting in its own right, two additional considerations 
are important in the context of labor mobility in transition economies. First, the next round of 
EU enlargement is expected to bring a net inflow of migrants from the acceding countries to 
the current EU members. While most experts estimate that the inflow will be relatively 
modest (see Fidrmuc et al., 2002, for a survey of migration forecasts and discussion of labor-
market implications of immigration), this expectation is not generally shared by policy makers 
or the public at large in the EU, and especially in the front-line countries such as Austria and 
Germany. While the paper at hand does not present an alternative forecast of the migration 
potential, it sheds light on the patterns of migration in the countries that are likely to be 
included in the first wave of EU enlargement. The comparison with Southern European 
countries is particularly instructive in this context.  
Second, the efficacy of migration as a shock-absorbing mechanism will have important 
repercussion for the transition economies’ future membership in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). If the new entrants continue to be exposed to asymmetric shocks (compared to 
those affecting the EMU core countries), giving up autonomous monetary policy will increase 
the need for alternative adjustment mechanisms. As labor mobility is one of such 
mechanisms, its efficacy in facilitating regional adjustment will have important repercussions 
also for the question of optimality of the transition countries’ accession to the EMU.  
In general, net migration does respond to regional economic conditions in the expected 
way – net immigration is positively related to the average wage and negatively to the 
unemployment rate prevailing in the destination region. However, the effect is economically 
very small – sizeable wage and unemployment differentials only give rise to modest net 
migration flows. This is so because wages and unemployment affect gross inflows and 
outflows similarly. Thus, regions with high wages tend to experience high immigration as 
well as emigration (rather than high immigration and low emigration). This pattern appears 
quite universally across all transition economies included in the analysis. In some transition 
economies, the effect of unemployment on gross migration flows is similar – high 
unemployment discourages not only immigration to but also emigration from depressed 
regions. This pattern implies that regions with relatively favorable economic conditions 
display high migration – both inbound and outbound – whereas depressed regions show low 
mobility and thus remain locked in with low average wages and high unemployment. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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Moreover, migration flows have generally been declining since the onset of transition. The 
efficacy of labor mobility as a channel of regional adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks has been 
therefore rather low.  
After briefly reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on migration in the 
following section, the data and recent labor market developments in transition economies are 
discussed in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Results of the empirical analysis are presented in 
section 5. The implications for EU and EMU enlargement are then discussed in section 6. 
Finally, main conclusions of the present paper are summarized the last section.  
 
2  Migration: Theories and Empirical Evidence 
Theoretical foundations of modern migration literature
3 were laid by Todaro (1969), and 
Harris and Todaro (1970). In their framework, migration is motivated by expected earnings 
differentials, i.e. wage differential between home and destination regions, adjusted for the 
probability of employment at destination. Accordingly, the higher the wage (the lower the 
unemployment rate) in the region of destination, the greater will be immigration to that 
region. Faini and Venturini (1994) argue, however, that the effect of wages in the region of 
origin need not be linear because migration from poor regions may be limited by liquidity 
constraints. With rising wages at home, emigration may in fact increase rather than decline as 
the liquidity constraint ceases to be binding. Only for relatively affluent regions do rising 
wages reduce the incentive for migration. Borjas (1987) points out that migration responds 
not only to average wages but also to their dispersion reflecting underlying inter-regional 
differences in rewards to skills. In particular, regions (countries) with relatively egalitarian 
wage distribution will attract primarily low-skilled workers, whereas high-skilled workers will 
choose to migrate to regions with more uneven wage distribution, where the returns to skills 
are higher (Borjas, 1987). Stark (1991) moves the focus away from wage differentials. In 
particular, he explores the role of migration as a means for intra-family risk sharing – by 
moving to regions with imperfectly correlated income shocks, members of a family can 
reduce the variance of family income. Finally, Burda (1995) likens migration to investment 
decisions under uncertainty and argues that potential migrants may postpone migration 
because of option value of waiting, which he shows is positive. Accordingly, the prospects of 
                                                 
3 See Borjas (1994), and Ghatak and Levine (1998) for recent surveys of literature.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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an improvement at home and the option to migrate later in case of a further deterioration may 
in fact induce potential migrants to stay put.  
Most of the empirical literature focuses, in line with Harris and Todaro’s insights, on the 
role of wages and employment prospects (typically proxied by unemployment) in explaining 
migration patterns. Often, social and demographic variables, as well as measures of various 
amenities and/or quality of life are included as well. Pissarides and McMaster (1990) find that 
relative unemployment and wages (both expressed as ratios to national mean values) 
significantly affect inter-regional migration in Great Britain, but the resulting regional 
adjustment to shocks is very slow. Jackman and Savouri (1992), who also study British 
migration, obtain a similar finding for unemployment and vacancy rates but find the opposite 
result for wages (migration from high to low wage regions). Decressin (1994) in his analysis 
of migration among West German Federal States finds results similar to those of Pissarides 
and McMaster.  
An important aspect of migration is its capacity to facilitate regional adjustment to 
idiosyncratic shocks.
4 When factors of production are mobile, labor and capital move in 
response to output shocks until marginal returns are equalized across regions. If, on the other 
hand, factor mobility is limited, asymmetric shocks lead to persistent inter-regional 
differentials in unemployment and wages.
5 Blanchard and Katz (1992) assess regional 
adjustment using US state-level data and conclude that the bulk of adjustment occurs via labor 
mobility (after an initial increase in unemployment) rather than capital mobility or price and 
wage adjustment. Moreover, the adjustment is relatively fast, with the effect of a shock 
disappearing completely after five to seven years. Hence, labor in the US is highly mobile and 
responds readily to idiosyncratic economic shocks. In contrast, Decressin and Fatas (1995) 
find that in Western Europe, the effects of such shocks are absorbed mainly by changes in 
labor-force participation rather than migration. Indeed, Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) argue 
that the responsiveness of migration to unemployment and wage differentials is much lower in 
the EU compared to the US. As a result, wage and unemployment differentials are generally 
greater and more persistent in Europe than in the US. This lack of labor mobility is often seen 
as a potential threat to the stability of the EMU (see Eichengreen, 1993, 1998; Braunerhjelm 
                                                 
4 This role of migration is emphasized by the optimum currency area literature, as initiated by Mundelll 
(1961) and McKinnon (1963).  
5 Mobility of one of the factors of production is sufficient to facilitate regional adjustment – either labor 
moves to where wages are high and jobs available, or capital moves to regions where labor is cheap and 
plentiful.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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et al., 2000). When idiosyncratic shocks have permanent or highly persistent effects, pressure 
for accommodating policy measures in affected regions or countries intensifies. The ability of 
individual countries in Europe to implement such measures, however, is severely limited 
because of the loss of monetary autonomy and the constraints on fiscal policy imposed by the 
Maastricht criteria.  
Migration in transition economies received little attention so far, in part perhaps because 
of lack of suitable data. The main exception is the former East Germany, where massive 
outflow of East Germans to West Germany was expected in the wake of the reunification but 
did not materialize (see Burda, 1999, and Hunt, 2000). On the contrary, by mid 1990s, the 
number of migrants moving to the East approximately equalized with that leaving for West 
Germany. The lack of massive migration is often attributed to rapid (partial) convergence of 
wages in the new Federal States to the West German level and the transfers from the West 
(see Sinn, 1999), or the expectation of such convergence (Burda, 1995). The empirical 
analysis of Burda (1999) and Hunt (2000) confirms the importance of wage and 
unemployment differentials, but also highlights the generally low labor mobility in Germany 
(East and West).  
 
3  Data 
The paper at hand analyzes migration flows in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia. The choice of these countries was motivated by several considerations. First, they 
all are candidates for EU membership and have very high probability to be included in the 
next wave of EU enlargement. Second, since the collapse of communism, they have 
undergone rigorous economic and political reforms and, by late 1990s, have, by and large, 
accomplished the transition from central planning to market economy. Finally, and rather 
importantly, the necessary regional data is available for these countries.  
Is interesting to compare patterns of migration in transition economies with market 
economies. Therefore, the analysis is also performed for three Southern European countries – 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Comparison with the countries should be particularly instructive, as 
these countries share several common features with Eastern European transition economies: 
they are relatively similar with respect to the level of development, labor market rigidities and 
regional disparities. In addition, Spain and Portugal also have a history of being ruled by 
authoritarian regimes in recent past. Studies that analyzed migration in Western European William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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countries include Decressin (1994) for West Germany, and Pissarides and McMaster (1990), 
and Jackman and Savouri (1992) for the UK. 
Comparisons across countries, however, are hindered by the different in the size of 
regions used in the analysis. In general, the transition economies have smaller regions, with 
the average population ranging from 136,000 in Czech Republic to 790,000 in Poland. In 
contrast, the average population of regions in the EU countries ranges between 1.4 million in 
Portugal and 4.3 million in Spain. Clearly, smaller regions offer better approximation of the 
local labor market conditions. On the other hand, data pertaining to smaller regions also 
capture greater fraction of migration flows that are not labor-market related, for example 
urban-to-suburban migration or moves between two adjacent districts without change of 
employment. Some types of non-labor migration – in particular urban-to-suburban min – can 
be easily controlled for in the analysis. As far as the remaining non-labor migration is not 
correlated with labor market variables, it should not systematically bias the results.  
The periods covered by the data differ somewhat. The data for the transition economies 
cover between four and seven years during 1990s. The data for the EU countries span from 
late 1980s to mid 1990s, covering between six and twelve years.  
The data report overall immigration and emigration per region, without distinguishing the 
regions of origin or destination of migrants, and are based on records from municipal 
population registers. Obviously, the fact that the data report population migration rather than 
labor migration may cause problems when interpreting the results, because population 
migration does not distinguish between employment-related migration and non-labor 
migration (because of marriage or divorce, education, retirement, and the like). This, 
however, is a general problem of most migration studies, as typically only population-
migration data are available. Parikh and van Leuvensteijn (2000) compare population and 
labor migration data for Germany and find that regressions that use population and labor 
migration yield similar results, as long as migration figures are normalized by population and 
labor force, respectively.  
 
4  Labor Market Developments in Transition Economies  
The transition from central planning to a market economy has had dramatic labor-market 
repercussions. The formerly socialist countries set out to reform their economies with 
essentially no (official) unemployment and very egalitarian distribution of wages. In the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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course of transition, overall unemployment as well as regional disparities in unemployment 
and especially wages increased rapidly, as Figures 1 through 3 clearly demonstrate (see the 
Appendix for additional details).  
Regional distribution of unemployment and wages in transition economies is strongly 
persistent: correlation coefficients between regional unemployment rates (wages) in 1991 and 
1996 are 0.52 (0.70) for the Czech Republic, 0.45 (0.80) for Slovakia, 0.92 (0.93) for Poland 
and 0.74 (0.85) for Hungary (between 1991 and 1997). Hence, regions that were stricken by 
high unemployment and low wages at the outset of transition in general remained 
economically depressed also five years later. Regions with high unemployment tend to have 
also low wages – in 1996, the correlation between unemployment rates and average wages 
was –0.10 for the Czech Republic, –0.68 for Slovakia, –0.62 for Hungary and  –0.41 for 
Poland. Negative correlation between unemployment and wages suggests low efficacy of 
migration in smoothing regional unemployment and income differentials. In contrast, even 
with high and effective labor mobility, a zero net migration equilibrium is conceivable 
whereby high wages compensate for high unemployment (thus leading to positive correlation 
between unemployment and wages).  
In the presence of substantial regional disparities, workers in depressed regions stand to 
gain by moving to regions with higher wages and/or better employment opportunities. If this 
mechanism is effective, migration will eventually smooth away the effects of asymmetric 
shocks. Nevertheless, despite sizeable and growing gap between prosperous and depressed 
regions, migration in transition economies in fact declined in the course of reforms (see the 
Appendix). There may be several reasons for the overall fall in migration – rising costs of out-
of-district job search and moving, or worsening situation at the housing market. Rising 
unemployment nation wide may also discourage migration as it reflects a general 
deterioration of employment prospects (as argued by Decressin, 1994).  
Because of the different size of regions, direct comparison of labor mobility in transition 
economies and Western European countries is not straightforward. In general, the smaller the 
regions, the greater is the extent of migration across regional boundaries. Hence, when 
considering the size of regions, labor mobility in transition countries appears very low in 
international comparison.  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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5  Migration as Adjustment to Shocks  
Migration is one of the principal mechanisms (alongside capital mobility and price 
flexibility) for absorbing adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Consider a region hit by a 
permanent negative demand shock. As a result of such a shock, unemployment rises and 
wages fall. The region can absorb, or smooth away, the effects of this shock in a number of 
ways. First, via migration –adverse labor-market conditions may induce the region’s residents 
to leave and take up employment in regions with higher wages and better employemtn 
prospects. Second, via capital mobility – lower wages and plentiful labor may induce new 
firms to move into the region. And finally, the relative price level can adjust sufficiently 
(either by falling wages and prices or by currency depreciation, if the region has its own 
currency) so that demand for the region’s products rises again. This section investigates the 
efficacy of the first channel of regional adjustment, migration, and its responsiveness to 
regional economic characteristics, in particular unemployment rates and average wages. 
The dependent variables are both gross and net migration normalized by population – so 
that they measures migration rates rather than flows. The data record the total number of 
migrants (inbound and outbound) per district, without identifying the regions of origin or 
destination. Gross inflow and outflow rates are strongly correlated, with correlation 
coefficients of 0.78 for the Czech Republic, 0.77 for Slovakia and 0.92 for Poland (the 
correlations are measured over the entire available period for each country, only net migration 
flows are available for Hungary). This implies that if some variables affect both inflows and 
outflows in the same direction, the coefficients estimated for the net immigration rate may be 
biased (see Bauer and Zimmerman, 1995). Therefore, it is important to consider both gross 
and net migration. Gross migration flows also appear strongly persistent (much more so than 
net migration), the correlation coefficients for gross migration rates in 1992 and 1996 are 
between 0.6 and 0.8 for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.  
The analysis covers between three and seven years for the transition countries and 
between seven and twelve years for the EU countries (the choice of periods is mandated 
primarily by data availability). All regressions include year dummies, with the first available 
year as the reference year. The results for the transition economies are reported in Tables 1 
through 4. The focus of the analysis is on the impact of regional unemployment rates and 
average wages on inter-regional migration. Therefore, the most parsimonious regressions are 
estimated only with these two variables. These results are reported in the first panel of each 
Table. The wage is normalized by the nation-wide average wage to eliminate the effects of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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wage inflation. Both unemployment and wages are lagged by one year because of their 
possible endogeneity in migration.  
Clearly, many other factors besides unemployment and wages affect migration: the 
quality of infrastructure and amenities, the regions’ social, cultural and demographic 
characteristics, and the like. Therefore, regressions reported in the second panel of each table 
contain additional demographic and socio-economic variables: the (logarithm of) population 
density (as a measure of urbanization, as well as congestion), and a dummy variable for 
suburban districts (i.e. those immediately adjacent to city districts
6). The third panel then 
allows for a non-linear effect of wages on migration. In particular, fixed migration costs may 
discourage mobility at low levels of wage differentials, in which case average wages would 
have a U-shaped effect on migration. On the other hand, regions with substantially above 
average wages then should attract a disproportionate number of migrants (hence, a finding of 
a U-shaped effect of migration on wages would also have important implications for East-
West migration in the wake of EU enlargement).  
Finally, the regressions reported in the last panel of each Table contain further socio-
economic and demographic variables: a measure of the size of the nascent private sector 
proxied by the number of small private unincorporated entrepreneurs (excluding farmers) as 
the percentage of population; employment in the industry and agriculture as the percentage of 
total employment; the share of persons with university education; the share of Roman 
Catholics (in the Czech Republic and Slovakia); the share of persons above retirement age; 
and the shares of main ethnic minorities – the Romany (Gypsies) in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.
7  
The results suggest that although unemployment rates and average wages indeed affect 
migration in transition economies, the pattern is only imperfectly consistent with the role of 
migration as a mechanism of regional adjustment to shocks. In order for migration to be 
effective as a channel of regional adjustment, gross (and net) immigration should be 
positively related to average wages and negatively to unemployment, while gross emigration 
should be positively related to unemployment and negatively to wages. However, this is not 
the pattern that obtains for migration in the transition economies. On the one hand, 
                                                 
6 The city districts (along with the names of their respective suburban districts) are Prague (Prague East 
and Prague West), Brno (Brno-vicinity), Plzen (Plzen South, Plzen North and Rokycany) and Ostrava (Frydek 
Mystek, Karvina and Novy Jicin) in the Czech Republic; Bratislava (Bratislava-vicinity) and Kosice (Kosice-
vicinity) in Slovakia; and Budapest (Pest) in Hungary.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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unemployment and average wages have the correct signs in the regressions with net migration 
and are usually at least marginally significant. Hence, it appears that high wages and low 
unemployment indeed encourage net immigration. On the other hand, unemployment 
apparently discourages overall migration (except in Poland), i.e. not only immigration but also 
emigration. Similarly, high wages tend to be associated with higher overall migration, 
inbound and outbound. Hence, the efficacy of migration in facilitating relocation of labor 
from depressed districts to the relatively prosperous ones appears rather limited. Instead, 
regions with favorable economic conditions tend to experience high immigration as well as 
emigration, whereas depressed regions display generally low labor mobility.  
Allowing for a non-linear relationship between wages and migration should help capture 
the role of fixed migration costs. If the ex ante costs of job search and moving present a 
barrier to migration, the relationship should be U-shaped – migration pays only when the 
resulting wage gain is large enough. Thus, high wage regions should receive a 
disproportionate number of migrants (the effect on gross emigration is less clear-cut – a U-
shaped relationship would indicate that migrants are liquidity constrained prior to moving and 
thus cannot move even if the post-migration gain sufficiently large). The regressions reveal a 
rather surprising pattern. The results for gross migration are mixed, the effect of wages 
appears hump-shaped in the Czech Republic and U-shaped for Poland and Slovakia (and, as 
before, wages affect gross immigration and emigration in the same way). The effect on net 
immigration, however, turns out hump-shaped – rather than U-shaped – in all four countries. 
In other words, high-wage regions tend to receive a disproportionately low number of 
migrants, despite their high wages. Moreover, wages beyond certain level (ranging between 
4.7% and 27.5% above national average wage for Slovakia and Hungary, respectively), 
apparently lead to falling net immigration. The hump shaped effect may be driven by outliers, 
in particular the major city districts, which typically experienced net emigration despite high 
wages. However, with the exception of Hungary, the pattern remains robust also when re-
estimating the regressions with dummies for the city districts or the districts that contain the 
capital city, or when the urban districts are completely omitted. For Hungary (see column 4 of 
Table 4), the inclusion of a dummy for Budapest (the capital city and the only city district) 
changes the pattern into a U-shaped one, in line with expectations. 
8 The hump-shaped 
                                                                                                                                                         
7 For the sake of comparability, most of the discussion below, nevertheless, centers on the results obtained 
with unemployment rate, average wage, population density and suburban dummies only.  
8 The results for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland are not substantially different from those 
obtained without urban or capital-city dummies, and are therefore not reported but can be obtain upon request.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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relationship between wages and net immigration in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland 
may be due to tight housing markets in the high-wage regions. Thus, high rents and house 
prices may discourage potential migrants despite large and persistent wage differentials.
9  
The additional socio-economic and demographic variables appear to exert important 
effect on migration as well. Urbanization (measured by the log of population density) 
discourages net immigration (possibly because of congestion). Its effect on gross flows differs 
across the individual countries though. The dummy for suburbs turns out to be quite important 
in explaining migratory flows – suburban districts tend to have higher overall migration and 
receive a net inflow of migrants.  
The number of entrepreneurs in the region, intended as a measure of the emerging private 
sector, is significantly and positively related to the inflow and outflow of migrants (except in 
Poland). It also appears to encourage net immigration. Hence, districts with a large and 
vibrant private sector tend to display higher labor mobility and attract a net migration inflow. 
This result is similar to that obtained for average wages, and may indeed reflect the same 
underlying pattern – the nascent private sector likely attracts the more productive and better 
skilled workers, and these workers are in turn more mobile relative to the rest of the 
population. As with wages, however, the bulk of migration flows again appears to be among 
districts with relatively favorable economic conditions. In order to better facilitate regional 
adjustment, entrepreneurial activity should encourage immigration and discourage rather than 
encourage emigration. The only transition economy where this appears to be the case(at least 
partially) is Poland, where the effect of entrepreneurial activity on immigration is insignificant 
and the effect on emigration is negative.  
It is instructive to compare transition economies with market economies. Tables 5 
through 7 present regression results obtained for Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where migration is 
related to regional unemployment rates, average wages as well as population density (because 
of the larger size of Western European regions, the dummy for suburban regions is irrelevant). 
The results are mixed. In contrast to the transition economies, the pattern of migration in Italy 
and Portugal is rather close to the optimal response of migration to regional unemployment 
and wages. In particular, immigration is positively related to average wages and negatively to 
unemployment, whereas emigration is positively related to unemployment (the effect of 
wages on gross emigration appears negative for Portugal and positive for Italy but the 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, reliable data on house prices are not available.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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coefficients are insignificant for both countries). The effects of unemployment and wages on 
net migration are also consistent with migration facilitating regional adjustment to shocks and 
strongly significant.
10 The results for Spain are more disappointing. Unemployment seems to 
discourage gross migration flows in Spain, although its effect on net migration has the correct 
sign. The effect of average wages appears with incorrect sign for gross as well as net flows. 
As with the transition economies, when considering a non-linear effect of wages on migration, 
the relationship appears hump-shaped.  
Hence, the evidence on the pattern of migration in transition economies suggests that 
migration does respond to regional differences in unemployment rates and wages, but in a 
manner that is only partially consistent with migration serving as a channel of regional 
adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks. Low mobility in depressed regions may be attributed to 
several factors. First, fixed costs of migration (for example, search and information costs, 
costs of moving, etc.) may be sufficiently high to deter low-wage earners and the unemployed 
from migrating (although the hump-shaped relationship between wages and net migration 
does not appear consistent with this explanation). Second, employment prospects for high-
skilled labor may be generally better so that the pool of potential migrants may consist largely 
of high-skilled workers earning relatively high wages. Finally, the low mobility in depressed 
regions may be due to structural factors. For example, if workers’ human capital is not 
transferable across industries, then the unemployed workers in regions that were traditionally 
dominated by communist-era industries may have little options other than staying put.  
Even more importantly, the potential effect of migration on regional differences in 
unemployment and wages is economically small. According to the regressions estimated with 
unemployment, wages, population density and dummies for suburbs, a ten percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate should give rise to a marginal net outflow between 0.03 
and 0.25 percentage point of a district’s population annually. Similarly, an increase of average 
wages by 10 percentage points relative to the national average is associated with an increase 
in the annual net migrant inflow between 0.03 and 0.08 percentage point (recall that wages are 
expressed in ratios to national average rather than in levels or logs). Table 8 reports a simple 
index measuring the responsiveness of migration to regional unemployment rates and average 
wages. The calculation is based on the regressions with unemployment rates, average wages, 
population density and suburban dummy (where applicable). The index adds the coefficient 
                                                 
10 Italy is often brought up as an example of a country with very immobile labor force and persistent 
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obtained for the unemployment rate (multiplied by -10) and the coefficient obtained for the 
average wage (divided by 10). Hence, the index quantifies the combined effect of a ten 
percentage-point difference in unemployment rate and a ten percentage point difference in 
average wage on net immigration – the higher is the value of the index, the greater is the 
response of migration to regional economic conditions. As the Table reveals, the resulting 
population increase ranges between 0.08% in Poland and 0.33% in Hungary. With the pace of 
adjustment this slow, it is not at all surprising that regional differences in unemployment rates 
and wages in the transition economies have been highly persistent. In contrast, the index for 
Portugal is almost five times higher (so that the ten percentage-point differential in 
unemployment and wages leads to a net inflow of 1.5% of the regions population) than the 
Hungarian index. The Italian index comes close to the figure for Hungary and the Czech 
Republic whereas the Spanish index is almost zero (this is because of the wrong sign on the 
effect of wages obtained for Spain). Hence, there is substantial degree of variability in the 
efficacy of migration in facilitating regional adjustment within transition economies, as well 
as when comparing them with Southern European countries. Except for Portugal, the potential 
impact of migration on adverse effects of asymmetric shocks appears rather small.  
 
6  Implications for EU and EMU Enlargement 
Recently, mobility of Eastern European labor received considerable attention also for a 
different reason – accession to the European Union will eventually introduce the possibility 
for East Europeans to seek employment throughout the Union. Some current EU member 
countries, especially the frontline countries, Austria and Germany, are concerned about the 
prospects of a large influx of migrants from the East. Thus, it is feared that scores of migrants 
will be attracted by high Western European wages, increasing unemployment and driving 
down wages of the incumbent workers (see Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, and Boeri and 
Bruecker, 2000, for assessment of potential post-enlargement migration).  
While the empirical results presented in this paper do not directly enable a forecast of 
post-enlargement migration, several lessons can be drawn. First, labor mobility in the 
accession-candidate countries has been low and falling, despite large and increasing wage and 
unemployment disparities across regions. Second, migration appears to occur chiefly among 
relatively prosperous regions rather than from depressed ones to those with better economic 
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conditions. As discussed above, this may reflect the fact that a large fraction of migrants are 
relatively high skilled high-wage earners. If this pattern continues after the candidate 
countries’ entry to the EU, free mobility of labor may actually have adverse effects on the 
new entrants (and positive effects on the current members) in as much as it would involve 
mainly migration of highly skilled workers. Finally, the response of net migration to regional 
economic characteristics, while statistically significant, is not significant in the economic 
sense – sizeable differentials in average wages and unemployment rates give rise only to very 
modest net migration flows. This is illustrated in Table 8 – for example, Portuguese migrants 
appear much more responsive to regional economic conditions than their counterparts in 
transition economies. The Czech Republic and Hungary seem comparable to Italy in terms of 
migration responsiveness, whereas Slovakia and Poland show much weaker response of 
migration to economic incentives.  
The present paper also yields implications with respect to the eventual participation of the 
transition economies in the EMU. It is envisaged that the new members will join the EMU in 
due course after becoming members of the EU. This, however, will be an important policy 
decision, with potentially far-reaching economic implications for the accession countries as 
well as the incumbent EMU members (in particular, premature admission of new members 
may undermine the stability of the union as a whole). In the course of intensifying integration, 
the accession countries should eventually become exposed to similar shocks as the core EMU 
countries. However, this process can be lengthy and in the meantime the accession countries 
are likely to continue experiencing shocks that are different from those affecting the EMU 
core (for example, the transition economies will be more prone to suffer due to adverse 
economic or political developments in the former Soviet Union countries). Indeed, Frenkel et 
al. (1999) and Horvath (2001) find that the shocks affect the transition economies are largely 
uncorrelated with those prevailing in the major EMU economies.  
Joining the EMU implies relinquishing autonomy over monetary policy as well as 
submitting to important restrictions on fiscal policy (due to the Maastricht criteria imposing 
ceilings on public deficits and debt). Hence, the set of tools available for dealing with 
asymmetric shocks will be severely reduced by EMU membership. If the accession countries 
are exposed to asymmetric shocks and their labor markets cannot adjust easily enough to such 
shocks, then early participation in the EMU may not be the optimal exchange-rate regime for 
these countries. By retaining their separate currencies, the accession countries will be better 
able to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, given the low responsiveness of labor mobility William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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to regional unemployment and wages, it appears that the candidate countries may not be well 
equipped to deal with adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Transitional barriers to labor 
mobility in the wake of the enlargement would in fact only aggravate this problem. Hence, an 
early entry to the EMU could make the monetary union more fragile and be potentially costly 
both in economic and political terms.  
 
7  Conclusions 
Labor mobility has the potential to serve as an important channel of regional adjustment 
to idiosyncratic shocks, as emigration from depressed regions to the more prosperous ones 
helps reduce inter-regional differentials in unemployment rates and earnings. This paper 
assesses the efficacy of migration in facilitating regional adjustment in several post-
communist countries in transition. Economic reforms have had largely asymmetric 
repercussions in these countries, resulting in large and persistent unemployment and wage 
differentials, thus making the need for effective regional adjustment particularly acute. 
However, the results of the present paper indicate that the role played by labor mobility has 
been rather limited. While migration indeed responds to inter-regional wage differentials, its 
responsiveness to unemployment is weaker (and less robust to changes in regression 
specification). Moreover, the effect of wage differentials on migration is only partially 
consistent with regional adjustment occurring via migration. Although wages have a positive 
effect on net migration, they are positively correlated with overall mobility – both gross 
immigration and emigration. Hence, depressed regions experience low overall migration 
(inbound and outbound) rather than a net outflow of migrants. The effect of unemployment is, 
to some extent, similar (although as emphasized above it is less robust to changes in 
regression specifications) – unemployment tends to discourage not only immigration but also 
emigration. When comparing post-communist transition economies with Southern European 
countries, migration patterns in Italy and especially Portugal appear much more effective in 
facilitating regional adjustment than those in transition economies.  
Yet, gross migration flows in transition countries are not negligible – in 1996, gross 
migration (as a percentage of population) ranged between 0.6% in Slovakia and 1.1% in 
Poland. However, gross immigration and emigration are strongly correlated and hence the 
resulting net migration is tiny. This pattern can also be traced in the regression results 
presented above – while several socio-economic and demographic factors significantly affect 
gross migration, they often have a similar effect on the inflow and the outflow of migrants. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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Even though net migration is found to respond to regional economic characteristics, the 
effects are economically small and large inter-regional differentials in unemployment and 
average wages only give rise to modest net migration flows.  
The pattern of labor mobility prevailing in transition economies has several important 
implications. First, regional differentials in unemployment and wages will not get smoothed 
away by migration. Indeed, as Table 8 demonstrates, it would take decades rather than years 
for moderately large unemployment and wage differentials to be smoothed away solely by 
means of migration. An appropriate policy response aimed at increasing labor mobility may 
be needed in order to avert the creation of new Mezziogiorni. Second, given the low labor 
mobility – and its low responsiveness to economic incentives – in the accession countries, it 
seems unlikely that there will be a massive East-West migration in the wake of the next EU 
enlargement. East Europeans do not move readily even within their own countries, despite 
sizeable wage and unemployment differentials. Although wage differentials with respect to 
the current EU members are larger, so are migration costs and informal (e.g. linguistic and 
cultural) barriers to migration. Third, because of the low efficacy of migration in smoothing 
away inter-regional differentials in unemployment and wages, an early membership in the 
EMU is not necessarily the optimal policy choice for the accession countries. EMU 
membership stipulates loss of autonomous monetary policy and imposes important limitations 
on counter-cyclical fiscal policy. As the transition countries continue to face different shocks 
than the EMU core, at least in medium term, they may indeed benefit from retaining the 
option to adjust their exchange rates.  
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Table 4 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Hungary 1994–1998  
  Net Inflows  Net Inflows  Net Inflows  Net Inflows  Net Inflows 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
Constant  2.364 (4.51) 0.685 (3.48) -2.003 (1.52) 4.386 (2.22) 0.877 (2.10)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.065 (-5.11)  -0.025  (-5.75) -0.025 (2.39)  -0.030  (7.78)  -0.040  (-8.56)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -1.668 (-3.95)  0.832  (2.62) 5.827 (2.39)  -9.460  (2.21)  0.680  (1.99)
Wage Ratio Squared        -2.782 (2.01)  5.589  (2.39)   
Population  Density  [log]     -0.254  (-7.31) -0.152 (2.25)  -0.007 (0.12) 0.002 (0.03)
Dummy Pest      1.418 (27.49) 1.358 (2.33)  1.259 (20.83)  1.124 (10.29)
Dummy  Budapest         -1.710  (4.55)  
Entrepreneurs [%]                -0.004  (-0.41)
Industrial  Employment           -0.001  (-0.17)
Agricult. Employment                0.002  (0.25)
University  Educated           -0.101  (-2.06)
Retirees                -0.021  (-1.94)
Dummy  1995  -0.085 (-0.86) -0.021 (-0.54) -0.020 (0.52) -0.032  (0.90) -0.047 (-1.14)
Dummy 1996  -0.121 (-1.19)  -0.043  (-1.03) -0.039 (0.97)  -0.060  (1.50)  -0.071  (-1.61)
Dummy 1997  -0.066 (-0.63)  0.002  (0.05) 0.008 (0.20)  -0.019  (0.52)  -0.021  (-0.51)
Dummy 1998  -0.103 (-0.93)  -0.015  (-0.39) -0.004 (0.09)  -0.050  (1.40)  -0.041  (-1.04)
Adj. R
2  0.210   0.888  0.891   0.907    0.906 
Joint Sign. Wage
1      0.002   0.000     
Max./Min. Effect at
2      1.047   0.846     
Notes: 
1 Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared. 
2 Level of the wage ratio at 
which it exerts maximum or minimum effect on migration.  
Number of observations: 100 (20 districts, average population 512,300 in 1995). T-statistics (heteroskedasticity 
robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the net inflow rate as a percentage of the region’s 
end-year population. The unemployment rate and wage ratio are lagged by one year. The entrepreneurs, retirees, 
industrial employment and agricultural employment refer to 1995, while the population density is as of 1994. 
Entrepreneurs, retirees and university educated are expressed as the percentage of district population. 
Employment in the industry and agriculture is the percentage of total employment.  
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Table 5 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Italy 1984-1995 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  0.756 (4.45) 0.683 (3.58) 0.073 (0.53)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.006  (2.28)  0.018  (6.05) -0.023  (13.28)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  0.785  (5.62)  0.100  (0.56) 0.684  (5.83)
Population Density [log] -0.170  (7.32)  -0.076  (3.62) -0.094  (7.24)
Adj. R
2  0.393   0.231   0.640  
  (4)    (5)    (6)   
Constant  7.230 (6.52)  13.447 (9.28) -6.218 (6.33)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.011  (4.55)  0.008  (3.63) -0.019  (11.95)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -12.287  (5.41)  -25.674  (8.50) 13.386  (6.70)
Wage Ratio Squared  6.672  (5.64)  13.156  (8.27) -6.483  (6.29)
Population  Density  [log] -0.184 (8.14)  -0.105 (5.59) -0.080 (6.44)
Adj. R
2  0.457   0.485   0.696  
Joint Sign. Wage
1  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Max./Min. Effect at
2  0.92   0.98   1.03  
Notes: 
1 Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared. 
2 Level of the wage ratio at 
which it exerts maximum or minimum effect on migration. 
Number of observations: 219 (20 regions, average population 2,863,400 in 1995). The observation for Valle 
d'Aosta in 1994 was dropped because of missing data; all observations pertaining to 1990 were dropped because 
of data problems. T-statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variables are 
the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year population. 
The unemployment rate, wage ratio and population density are lagged by one year.  
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Table 6 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Spain 1984-1994 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  1.130 (6.42) 0.965 (5.21) 0.165 (1.05)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.011  (2.42)  -0.006  (1.36) -0.005  (1.64)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -0.313  (1.99)  -0.027  (0.16) -0.286  (2.21)
Population Density [log] -0.008  (0.40)  -0.059  (2.86) 0.050  (3.06)
R
2  0.032   0.047   0.029  
  (4)    (5)    (6)   
Constant  -2.087 (2.11) 0.355 (0.37) -2.442 (2.70)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.009  (2.08)  -0.005  (1.29) -0.004  (1.20)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  5.937  (3.20)  1.158  (0.63) 4.779  (2.81)
Wage Ratio Squared  -3.040  (3.46)  -0.576  (0.65) -2.464  (3.01)
Population  Density  [log] -0.006 (0.29)  -0.058 (2.82) 0.052 (3.18)
Adj. R
2  0.056   0.043   0.058  
Joint Sign. Wage
1  0.00   0.80   0.00  
Max./Min. Effect at
2  0.98   1.01   0.97  
Notes: 
1 Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared. 
2 Level of the wage ratio at 
which it exerts maximum or minimum effect on migration. 
Number of observations: 187 (17 regions, average population 2,293,650 in 1994). Observations for Ceuta y 
Melilla were dropped. T-statistics (heteroskedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent 
variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year 
population. The unemployment rate, wage ratio and population density are lagged by one year.  
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Table 7 Determinants of Inter-regional Migration: Portugal 1987-1992 
  Gross Inflow  Gross Outflow Net Inflow 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
Constant  -0.788 (1.46) 2.582 (2.72) -3.369 (3.14)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.027  (2.38)  0.080  (1.30) -0.107  (1.78)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  2.698 (4.30) -1.474 (0.98) 4.172 (2.57)
Population Density [log] -0.279  (4.35)  -0.243  (1.51) -0.037  (0.23)
R
2  0.387   0.297   0.329  
  (4)    (5)    (6)   
Constant  2.708 (0.47)  30.525 (1.77) -27.817 (1.53)
Unempl. Rate (lagged)  -0.033  (2.15)  0.030  (0.52) -0.063  (1.09)
Wage Ratio (lagged)  -4.138  (0.35)  -56.122  (1.69) 51.984  (1.47)
Wage Ratio Squared  3.437  (0.56)  27.472  (1.68) -24.036  (1.37)
Population  Density  [log] -0.301 (4.45)  -0.419 (2.32) 0.118 (0.61)
Adj. R
2  0.373   0.335   0.350  
Joint Sign. Wage
1  0.00   0.23   0.02  
Max./Min. Effect at
2  0/60   1.02   1.08  
Notes: 
1 Refers to joint significance of the wage ratio and the wage ratio squared. 
2 Level of the wage ratio at 
which it exerts maximum or minimum effect on migration. 
Number of observations: 32 (7 regions, average population 1,408,610 in 1992). Several observations pertaining 
to 1987 and 1988 were dropped because of missing wage or unemployment data. T-statistics (heteroskedasticity 
robust) are reported in parentheses. The dependent variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net 
inflow rate, as percentages of the region’s end-year population. The unemployment rate, wage ratio and 
population density are lagged by one year.  
 
Table 8 Migration Effectiveness Index 
Czech Rep.  Slovakia  Poland  Hungary Italy  Spain  Portugal 
0.238 0.096 0.080 0.333 0.298 0.021 1.487 
Notes: The index is based on the regressions with unemployment rates, average wages, population density and 
suburban dummy (where applicable) as reported above. The index adds up the coefficient obtained for the 
unemployment rate (multiplied by -10) and the coefficient obtained for the average wage (divided by 10) 
estimated in regressions that also included population density and dummies for suburban districts (where 
applicable) as reported above.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 441 
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Figure 1 Coefficient of Variation of Average Wages 
 
Figure 2 Coefficient of Variation of Unemployment Rate 
 
Figure 3 Gross Immigration Rage 
Notes: Country abbreviations are CZ: Czech Republic, SK: Slovakia, PL: Poland and HU: Hungary.  
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Appendix: Statistics on Labor Market Developments and Migration  
Table A1 Labor-Market Developments and Migration: Czech Republic  
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Unemployment 4.62  2.9  3.89 3.38 3.08 3.79 5.63 7.81 
Standard Deviation  1.88  1.41  1.94 1.73 1.7 1.91 2.53 3.06 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  40.7%  48.6% 49.9% 51.2% 55.2% 50.3% 44.9% 39.2% 
Wages  [CZK]  3745 4571 5551 6411 7661 9056 9757  11239 
Standard  Deviation  234 361 446 575 656 786 958  1365 
Coef. of Variation [%]  6.2%  7.9% 8.0% 9.0% 8.6% 8.7% 9.8%  12.1% 
Gross Migration [%]  n.a.  1.26 1.15 1.01 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.98 
Standard Deviation    0.30  0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.41 
Maximum   2.43 2.31 2.29 2.33 2.33 2.57 3.32 
Minimum   0.82 0.73 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59 
 
Table A2 Labor-Market Developments and Migration: Slovakia  
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Unemployment 12.89  11.82  16.57 17.7 14.56 14.56  n.a.  n.a. 
Standard Deviation  3.23  3.65 4.91 5.89 4.79 5.06     
Coeff. of Variation [%]  25.1%  30.9% 29.6% 33.3% 32.9% 34.8%     
Wages [SKK]  3635  4185  5026 5747 6640  7267  n.a.  n.a. 
Standard Deviation  163  323  408 529 664  862     
Coeff. of Variation [%]  4.5%  7.7% 8.1% 9.2% 10.0%  11.9%     
Gross Migration [%]  n.a.  0.85  0.82 0.73 0.62 0.61  n.a.  n.a. 
Standard Deviation    0.21  0.21 0.20 0.18 0.23     
Maximum   1.51  1.41 1.39 1.23  1.40     
Minimum   0.42  0.44 0.34 0.29  0.28     
 
Table A3 Labor-Market Developments: Poland 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Unemployment 12.7  14.9  18.2 n.a. 16.8 14.9 11.9 12.0 
Standard Deviation  3.6  4.4  5.6 n.a. 5.1 4.8 4.2 4.1 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  28.1%  29.5% 31.0% n.a. 30.3% 32.4% 35.3% 34.5% 
Wages [PLZ]  167.73  269.15  358.39 479.2 632.6 797.5 965.7  1115.2 
Standard Deviation  13.07  23.31  35.22 54.0 70.5 87.5  109.7  126.9 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  7.8%  8.7% 9.8% 11.3% 11.1%  11.0% 11.4% 11.4% 
Gross Migration [%]  n.a.  1.3 1.2 n.a. n.a. 1.1 1.1  n.a. 
Maximum  n.a. 1.7 1.6 n.a. n.a. 1.5 1.6  n.a. 
Minimum  n.a. 0.7 0.7 n.a. n.a. 0.7 0.7  n.a. 
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Table A4 Labor-Market Developments: Hungary 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Unemployment 9.7  9.2  13.1 11.4 11.3 11.6 11.5 10.1 
Standard Deviation  3.5  3.2  3.8 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.2 3.9 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  35.5%  35.2% 29.1% 29.5% 30.3% 34.0% 36.0% 38.8% 
Wages [HUF]   20,315.8 24,753.8 30,960.7 36,200.9 43,080.6 52,458.3 61,338.2 
Standard Deviation    2,180.3  2,561.1 3,275.4 4,032.6 5,046.9 6,771.0 8,619.4 
Coeff. of Variation [%]    10.7%  10.3% 10.6% 11.1% 11.7% 12.9% 14.1% 
Net Migration [%]             
Maximum      -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 
Minimum      1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.5 
 
Table A5 Labor-Market Developments: Italy 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Unemployment 11.31  10.40  9.35 9.13 8.75 10.49 11.54 12.26 
Standard Deviation  6.34  6.44  6.16 5.80 4.68 5.48 6.20 6.95 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  56.0%  61.9% 65.9% 63.5% 53.4% 52.3% 53.7% 56.7% 
Wages  [ECU]  1579.92 1747.42 1928.57 2088.01 2126.98 1913.33 1895.32 1785.86 
Standard Deviation  139.21  164.17  178.69 190.60 196.74 169.94 173.72 158.35 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  8.8%  9.4% 9.3% 9.1% 9.2% 8.9% 9.2% 8.9% 
Gross Migration [%]  0.53  0.56 1.86 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50 
Maximum  1.30 1.36 3.06 1.14 1.24 1.12 1.20 1.22 
Minimum  0.33 0.32 0.18 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.31 
 
Table A6 Labor-Market Developments: Spain 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Unemployment  19.08 18.63 16.39 15.39 15.16 16.96 20.90 22.95 
Standard Deviation  5.27  4.84  5.24 5.45 5.28 5.21 5.49 5.21 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  27.6%  26.0% 32.0% 35.4% 34.8% 30.7% 26.2% 22.7% 
Wages  [ECU]  956.92 1130.42 1396.54 1676.73 1956.65 2212.69 2098.76 2033.41 
Standard Deviation  107.09  119.53  130.15 148.64 153.65 185.62 189.49 172.41 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  11.2%  10.6% 9.3% 8.9% 7.9% 8.4% 9.0% 8.5% 
Gross Migration [%]  0.45  0.57 0.65 0.64 0.38 0.53 0.55 0.60 
Maximum  1.44 2.25 2.26 1.47 1.11 1.28 1.17 1.00 
Minimum  0.19 0.27 0.32 0.41 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.34 
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Table A7 Labor-Market Developments: Portugal 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Unemployment 8.30 6.70 6.17 5.06 4.57 4.16 3.87 5.36 
Standard Deviation  3.93 3.30 4.26 3.32 2.66 2.30 1.76 1.82 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  47.37 49.30 68.99 65.62 58.28 55.27 45.52 33.91 
Wages [ECU]  402.92 435.47 471.27 518.11 601.05 721.68 859.86 851.72 
Standard Deviation  58.37 48.49 64.86 75.12 56.60 69.16 87.61 89.79 
Coeff. of Variation [%]  14.49 11.13 13.76 14.50  9.42 9.58 10.19 10.54 
Gross Migration [%]  0.20 0.14 0.20 0.50 0.54 0.18 0.33  n.a. 
Maximum 0.65 0.29 0.56 1.10 1.24 0.50 1.02  n.a. 
Minimum 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.09  n.a. 
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